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Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking 
the Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance 
Bradley W. ~ o o n d e ~ h *  
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code permits 
employees to exclude employer-sponsored health insurance1 
from adjusted gross in~ome.~  At the same time, employers may 
fully deduct the cost of purchasing health benefits for their 
 employee^.^ Taxpayers who are self-employed, however, can 
deduct only 30% of the cost of health insurance: and no 
deduction is available for those who neither are self-employed 
nor purchase insurance through their employer unless their 
health care expenses exceed 7.5% of their adjusted gross 
 income^.^ These provisions of the tax code have created an 
* Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School; J.D. 1994, Stanford Law School; 
B.A. 1990, Stanford University. The author thanks Professor Barbara Fried, 
Andrew Berke, Pat Konopka, and Srija Srinivasan for their helpful comments and 
suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay. 
1. For purposes of this essay, the terms "health insurance," "health 
coverage," and "health benefits" are interchangeable. They are meant to encompass 
all forms of private health coverage, including traditional indemnity insurance, 
employer self-insurance programs, preferred provider insurance and organizations 
(PPIs and PPOs), and health maintenance organizations (HMOs). 
2. 26 U.S.C. $ 106 (1989) ("Gross income of an employee does not include 
employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan."). 
3. See id. $ 162(a)(l). 
4. Permanent Extension and Increase of Deduction for Health Insurance 
Costs of Self-Employed Individuals, Pub. L. No. 104-7, $ 1, 109 Stat. 93 (1995) (to 
be codified a t  26 U.S.C. 8 162). In April 1995, Congress made the deduction 
permanent and increased the percentage deductible from the previous level of 25%. 
Ann Devroy, Clinton Signs Self-Employed Insurance Deduction, WASH. POST, Apr. 
12, 1995, a t  A9. President Clinton has subsequently proposed increasing the 
deduction to 50%. Robert Pear, Administration Proposes Federal Regulation of 
Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1995, a t  A24. 
5. 26 U.S.C. $ 213 (1988); see also Henry T. Greely, The Regulation of 
Private Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND 
REGUMTION 8-1, 8-23 (Mark A. Hall ed. 1993). 
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enormous incentive for taxpayers to acquire health coverage 
through employment-related groups. 
There are several plausible, public-regarding justifications 
for excluding health benefits from taxation. Foremost is that 
the government has many self-interested reasons to encourage 
taxpayers to purchase private health coverage. Inducing more 
consumers to obtain health insurance reduces public health 
care expenditures, promotes greater efficiency and equity in the 
health care system, and even furthers social j u s t i ~ e . ~  
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, resources devoted to health 
insurance arguably should be excluded from taxable income 
because they do not reflect a consumer's relative welfare or 
taxability . 
But these justifications do not fully explain the current tax 
treatment of health benefits. First, these rationales do not 
account for extending the tax  preference only to 
employer-sponsored insurance. This restriction is inequitable 
and regressive, benefiting those taxpayers for whom private 
health coverage is generally the least expensive.' These 
justifications also fail to explain why taxpayers are permitted 
to exclude the full cost of their health insurance regardless of 
the type of plan in which they enroll. The full exclusion allowed 
by 9 106 actually undermines the government's objectives of 
reducing public health care expenditures and promoting the 
efficient delivery of care.g 
The tax treatment of health benefits also aggravates 
several existing problems in the private health insurance 
market. By shielding consumers from the true cost of health 
coverage, the tax code harmfully distorts purchasing decisions, 
making demand for health coverage both excessive and 
cost-unconscious.10 And by establishing such strong incentives 
for taxpayers to obtain coverage through their employers, § 106 
has tied the purchase of health insurance to the employment 
setting, creating the problem of "job lock."" 
This essay argues that the tax treatment of health benefits 
needs reform. Part I1 examines the government's possible 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 42-58. 
7. See infia text accompanying notes 60-68. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 69-81. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 116-149. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 95-115. 
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rationales, both practical and theoretical, for exempting 
employer-sponsored health benefits from taxation. Part I11 
critiques these justifications and contends that the exclusion is 
both underinclusive and overextensive. Part IV discusses the 
detrimental impact of the current tax treatment of health 
benefits on the health insurance market. Finally, Part V argues 
that the government could solve many of the problems 
attributable to the tax treatment of health benefits by 
implementing three basic changes: (1) permitting all taxpayers 
to exclude or deduct the cost of acquiring health insurance, (2) 
limiting the amount of the exclusion or deduction to the 
regionally-adjusted cost of a standard benefits package, and (3) 
eliminating the tax provision. that permits employees to pay 
their portion of their health insurance premiums with pretax 
dollars. 
11. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT AX TREATMENT OF
HEALTH BENEFITS 
A. Instrumental Rationales 
One plausible explanation for exempting employer-spon- 
sored health insurance from taxation is that this exemption 
induces more taxpayers to obtain private health coverage. Ar- 
guably, the government has several compelling reasons for 
promoting the proliferation of private health insurance. By 
encouraging consumers to enroll in private plans, the govern- 
ment (1) reduces overall health expenditures, (2) decreases its 
own health care costs, (3) promotes a more equitable distribu- 
tion of costs among health care recipients, and (4) decreases 
the number of Americans forced into poverty due to catastroph- 
ic illnesses. l2 
Although approximately forty-one million Americans do not 
have health insurance of any kind,13 every American actually 
12. Another possible rationale for subsidizing taxpayers' purchase of private 
health coverage is more paternalistic. One could reasonably argue that, because 
people tend to discount the likelihood and cost of future illness, too few consumers 
purchase health coverage. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, THE HEALTH ECONOMY 265-66 
(1986). In this light, 5 106 aims to remedy the market imperfection of incomplete 
information for consumers. The exclusion simply raises the otherwise artificially 
low demand for health insurance to an efficient level. Under this theory, the ex- 
clusion merely amounts to a subsidy designed to coddle consumers into doing what 
is in their own best interest. 
13. Spencer Rich, More Access to Health Insurance Proposed: Key Features of 
Original Plan Abandoned; Medicare Savings Goal Rises, WASH. POST, June 14, 
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has some access to health care. A patchwork of laws, programs, 
and public providers guarantees that even uninsured patients 
receive medical care at  least in emergency situations. Most 
notably, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA)14 requires all hospitals with emergency 
care facilities to screen any patient who applies for emergency 
care.'' If hospital staff determine that the patient needs emer- 
gency treatment,16 EMTALA requires the hospital to treat the 
patient until her condition has stabilized.17 Hospitals or physi- 
cians who violate the requirements of EMTALA are subject to 
civil fines,'' private actions,lg and exclusion from Medicare 
or Medicaid reimb~rsement.'~ Another federal law, the 
Hill-Burton Act, also requires many hospitals to provide care to 
uninsured patients." Hill-Burton mandates that all hospitals 
that have received federal construction loans offer a minimum 
level of "community service" in the form of uncompensated 
Notwithstanding the provisions of EMTALA and 
Hill-Burton, as well as various state law  requirement^:^ pri- 
vate providers generally avoid treating uninsured patients 
because of the uncertainty of being reimbursed for providing 
the care. Consequently, uninsured patients receive the majority 
of their medical treatment at  public health care f a~ i l i t i e s .~~  
1995, a t  A21. Approximately 160 million Americans have private health insurance, 
while the remaining 55 million have coverage through a publicly sponsored pro- 
gram such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration, or the Indian 
Health Service. See Eli Ginzberg, The Limits of Health Reform-Revisited, 3 STAN. 
L. & POLV REV. 195, 195 (1991). 
14. 42 U.S.C. $ 1395dd(d)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). Congress enacted 
EMTALA as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82. 
15. 42 U.S.C. $ 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). For a thorough discus- 
sion of EMTALA's provisions, see Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Note, Son of COBRA: 
The Evolution of a Federal Malpractice Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1992). 
16. The statute defines an emergency medical condition as one in which "the 
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected" to cause 
serious harm to the patient. 42 U.S.C. 5 1395dd(e)(l)(A) (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). 
17. 42 U.S.C. $ 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). 
18. Id. $ 1395dd(d)(l)(A)-(B) (Supp. I1 1990). 
19. Id. $ 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (Supp. I1 1990). 
20. Id. $ 1395dd(d)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). 
21. See id. $ 291 (1988). 
22. See id. 5 291c(e) (1988). 
23. Several states have imposed a duty on hospitals to provide emergency 
medical services to all patients seeking such care. See Erik J. Olson, Note, No 
Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
449, 453-58 (1994). 
24. See Emily Friedman, Problems Plaguing Public Hospitals: Uninsured Pa- 
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Public providers, composed primarily of city and county hospi- 
tals, generally must provide care to community residents re- 
gardless of the patients' ability to pay.25 This safety net pro- 
vides millions of dollars worth of care to uninsured patients 
each year.26 For instance, Cook County Hospital in Chicago 
treats roughly 1,250 uninsured patients each day, roughly half 
its patient total.27 Likewise, nine-tenths of the patients treat- 
ed by the New York Health and Hospitals Corporation are 
either Medicaid recipients or uninsured.28 And 30% of the pa- 
tients treated at  Los Angeles County-University of Southern 
California Medical Center, which serves a majority of the 
county's poor residents, are ~ninsured.~'  
This patchwork of private and public providers effectively 
guarantees uninsured patients a very basic level of health care. 
While the majority of the uninsured cannot afford health insur- 
ance:' some individuals, relying on the existence of this safe- 
ty net, do not purchase private health coverage even though 
they could afford it. They are "individuals who remain unin- 
sured because they believe that in the event of serious illness 
they will get care anyway, and others will pick up the bill."31 
Roughly 75 to 80% of the uninsured are either employed or the 
tient Transfers, Tight Funds, Mismanagement, and Misperception, 257 JAMA 1850, 
1850-51 (1987). All told, over 65% of the patients treated at  the one hundred mem- 
ber institutions of the National Association of Public Hospitals are Medicaid recipi- 
ents or low income uninsured or underinsured. Health Care Service Delivery Infra- 
structure in Inner-City and Rural Communities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 206 
(1993) (statement of Ruth Rothstein, Director, Cook County Hospital) [hereinafter 
Hearings on Health Care Service Delivery Infiastructure]. 
25. For example, statutes in California and New York require public hospitals 
to provide treatment to all patients seeking care. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 17000 (Deering 1988); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 129 (McKinney 1990). 
26. A recent study estimated that American hospitals provided $13.2 billion in 
uncompensated care in 1989. John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Who Pays for 
Health Care in the United States? Implications for Health System Reform, 29 IN- 
QUIRY 231, 235 (1992). 
27. Hearings on Health Care Service Delivery Infrastructure, supra note 24, a t  
205 (statement of Ruth Rothstein). 
28. Id. at  216 (statement of Regina Morris, Chief Operating Officer of the 
New York Health and Hospitals Corporation). 
29. James Sterngold, Budget Slashes Could Close Hospital: Issues in Los An- 
geles: To Trim Costs or the Quality of Care?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1995, a t  A7. 
30. Gail R. Wilensky, Filling the Gaps in Health Insurance: Impact on Compe- 
tition, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988, at  133, 135 (noting that 69% of the uninsured 
earn less than $10,000). 
31. Victor R. Fuchs, National Health Insurance Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Win- 
ter 1991, a t  7, 9. 
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dependents of employed persons,32 and, as of 1986, 25% of the 
uninsured reported family incomes in excess of $30,000.~~ 
Those individuals who could purchase health coverage but 
nevertheless do not are "free riders" on the American health 
care system.34 Although assured of receiving emergency medi- 
cal treatment, they frequently pay less than the true cost of 
their care and sometimes pay nothing at  all, shifting their costs 
onto other participants in the system.35 
Three sources finance the majority of care delivered to 
uninsured patients in the United States. The first source is 
uninsured patients themselves. Health care providers, like 
other creditors, require patients to pay for as much of their 
care as possible. Even public hospitals generally require pa- 
tients to pay for their care according to a sliding fee scale based 
on the patient's ability to pay.36 The second major source of 
financing for uninsured care is government medical programs 
for indigent persons. Uninsured patients may spend down their 
assets to the point that they qualifjr for Medicaid, the joint 
state-federal program designed to provide medical care to per- 
sons unable to afford necessary medical care.37 They may also 
be eligible for local or state government programs for indigent 
care, or receive uncompensated care from public safety net pro- 
v i d e r ~ . ~ ~  The final source is provider cross-subsidization. 
When neither the patient nor the government adequately reim- 
burses a provider for the cost of treating uninsured patients, 
the provider must cover its uncompensated costs by 
cross-subsidizing.39 That is, the provider must increase its 
32. Wilensky, supra note 30, at 135. 
33. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Toward a Fail-safe Health-Insurance System, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 11, 1989, at  A10. 
34. See Main C. Enthoven, Managed Competition: An Agenda for Action, 
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988, at 25, 30 (stating that "a free market is likely to lead 
to the noncoverage or undercoverage of large numbers of people" and that "many 
consumers will seek a 'free ride'"). 
35. See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan 
for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality 
and Economy (Part I), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 30 (1989) ("When the unin- 
sured are seriously ill (and most expenses are for seriously ill patients), taxpayers, 
insured persons, or both end up paying for most of their care. Voluntarily or invol- 
untarily, some people are taking a free ride."). 
36. Telephone Interview with Srija Srinivasan, Chief Budget Analyst, Health 
Department, San Mateo County, Cal. (July 12, 1993). 
37. See 42 U.S.C. $5 1396-1396v (1988). 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
39. Even if a patient is Medicaid eligible, Medicaid will likely only reimburse 
12291 TAX POLICY AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 1235 
charges to patients with adequate coverage, ostensibly those 
with private insurance," to subsidize the costs of treating un- 
insured patients. Approximately 25% of the average hospital 
bill for a privately insured patient goes toward cross-subsidiza- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  
Given this system for financing the care of persons who 
lack private health coverage, the extent to which Americans 
choose not to purchase health insurance has significant public 
policy ramifications. It affects how equitably the costs of the 
health care system are allocated, the level of government's 
health care expenditures, and the overall efficiency of the 
health care system. By inducing more taxpayers to purchase 
health insurance, the government advances four significant 
policy objectives. First, it reduces the number of free riders. 
More taxpayers with private health coverage means more indi- 
viduals pay something into the system who otherwise would 
contribute less than their actual cost. As a result, health care 
costs are borne more equitably.42 
the provider for a percentage of its actual costs. A 1990 study showed that, on 
average, Medicaid pays approximately 55% of what private insurers pay for the 
same services. Anne Schwartz et al., Variation in Medicaid Physician Fees, HEALTH 
AFF., Spring 1991, at  131, 136-38. In some cases, reimbursement can be much less. 
In 1986, Maryland's Medicaid program reimbursed obstetricians as little as 26% of 
their regular charge for routine deliveries. Michael H. Fox et al., Effect of Medicaid 
Payment Levels on Access to Obstetrical Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1992, at  150, 
160 exhibit 6. 
40. Hospitals previosly used Medicare patients to cross-subsidize the cost of 
uncompensated care. In 1983, however, Medicare began its conversion to the Pro- 
spective Payment System (PPS). See Michael D. Rosko, A Comparison of Hospital 
Performance Under the Partial-Payer Medicare PPS and State All-Payer 
Rate-Setting Systems, 26 INQUIRY 48, 49 (1989). Under PPS, Medicare pays hospi- 
tals a fmed amount for each patient based on the patient's diagnosis regardless of 
how much care the patient actually requires. Id. Under the first year of PPS, hos- 
pital margins on PPS patients was 14.5%, but by 1990 it had shrunk nearly to 
zero. Stuart Guterman et al., Hospitals' Financial Performance in the First Five 
Years of PPS, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1990, a t  125, 126; see also Jack Hadley et al., 
Profits and Fiscal Pressure in the Prospective Payment System: Their Impacts on 
Hospitals, 26 INQUIRY 354, 354 (1989). Consequently, cross-subsidization using 
Medicare patients is virtually impossible. Extra charges to recover the costs of 
uncompensated care are, therefore, concentrated almost exclusively in the bills of 
the privately insured. 
41. Ron Winslow, National Health Plan Wins Unlikely Backer: Business, WALL 
ST. J. ,  Apr. 5, 1989, at  B1. Because of increasing competition, however, this figure 
is declining. 
42. See Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 35, a t  30 ("Those who can do so 
ought to contribute their fair share to their coverage and be insured."). A recent 
proposal for national health insurance stated that an important goal of any reform 
package must be to eliminate the "unnecessary and unfair cross-subsidization" 
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Second, enrolling more Americans in private health plans 
lessens the government's burden in financing and providing 
health care." Fewer uninsured individuals means fewer pa- 
tients for whom the government must finance or provide care, 
either through Medicaid or other programs for indigent per- 
sons. Because of increasing pressure to reduce the federal bud- 
get deficit, as well as the concomitant need for state and local 
governments to balance their budgets, containing spiraling 
health care spending has become an imperative across the 
political spectrum. For instance, President Clinton has repeat- 
edly asserted that "[tlhe key to long-term deficit reduction is 
controlling health care costs through health care reform."" 
Similarly, House Speaker Newt Gingrich has stated that "we 
have to rethink our health system" because current spending 
trends will lead to a "financial crash," and that Republicans in 
Congress will "make every decision" regarding health care 
"within the context of getting to a balanced budget."45 Reduc- 
ing health care costs is critical to deficit reduction. Through its 
various programs, the federal government funds more than 
30% of all personal health care purchased in the United 
 state^:^ and these outlays constitute the fastest growing con- 
tributor to the federal deficit.47 The government can reduce 
produced by the current system. Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for 'Responsible 
National Health Insurance,' HEALTH AFF., Spring 1991, at 5, 7. 
43. A separate question, not addressed here, is whether excluding 
employer-sponsored health insurance from taxation is a cost effective subsidy. It is 
quite possible that the foregone tax revenue caused by the exclusion exceeds the 
government's savings in financing and providing health care attributable to 5 106's 
inducement to purchase private insurance. It is estimated that eliminating the 
exclusion for employer-provided health benefits would increase federal tax revenues 
by $35.6 billion. M. Susan Marquis & Joan L. Buchanan, How Will Changes in 
Health Insurance Tax Policy and Employer Health Plan Contributions Affect Access 
to Health Care and Health Care Costs?, 271 JAMA 939, 944 (1994). 
44. Pear, supra note 4, at  A24. 
45. Balancing the Health Care Budget, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1995, a t  A26. 
46. Greely, supra note 5, at  8-20. According to surveys done by the American 
Hospital Association and the National Association of Public Hospitals, the govern- 
ment pays for 47% of hospital care given at  private hospitals and 75% of that 
given a t  public hospitals. Kevin Sack, Hard Cases at the Hospital Door, N.Y.  
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995, 5 4, a t  5. 
47. Dana Priest, Canadian-Style Plan 1st in Cost-Cutting, WASH. POST, July 
25, 1993, at  A15; see also Spencer Rich, Soaring Health Care Costs Heavy Burden 
for Agency, WASH. POST, June 24, 1993, a t  A17. The government pays directly for 
roughly 42% of all health care expenditures in the United States. VICTOR R. 
FVCm, THE F'UTURE OF HEALTH POLICY 38 (1993). 
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these expenditures and shift some of its risk to private insurers 
by enticing more taxpayers to purchase private coverage. 
Third, inducing more Americans to purchase private cover- 
age increases the number of persons who have access to prima- 
ry care, thereby promoting greater efficiency in medical 
treatment. For several reasons, the uninsured generally do not 
receive sufficient preventive medical services provided by pri- 
mary care physicians. For example, because the uninsured 
must pay the entire cost of outpatient visits out of pocket, they 
often attempt to "get by" without seeing a primary care doctor 
until their conditions have become truly serious.48 At the 
same time, many primary care providers simply refuse to see 
uninsured patients, fearing that the care will go uncompensat- 
ed.49 Moreover, under the weight of rising costs and shrinking 
budgets, local governments have been forced to reduce their 
primary care programs.50 Most notably, Los Angeles County 
decided in August 1995 to close all six of its comprehensive 
medical centers and twenty-nine of its thirty-nine community 
clinics, virtually eliminating the County's outpatient servic- 
e ~ . ~ ~  As a result, most public providers-to whom the unin- 
sured most often turn for care-cannot meet the demand for 
outpatient care.52 
48. A study of the uninsured population in the District of Columbia found 
that, of those uninsured patients reporting a problem in access to primary care, 
61.9% indicated cost as the most significant barrier. John Billings & Nina Teicholz, 
Uninsured Patients in District of Columbia Hospitals, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990, 
a t  158, 162 exhibit 3. 
49. Olson, supra note 23, a t  464 ("Medicaid and uninsured patients are gener- 
ally unable to obtain primary care in physicians' offices."). Studies of the services 
physicians offer Medicaid beneficiaries have rather conclusively demonstrated 
physicians' sensitivity to reimbursement rates. For instance, a recent study showed 
that access to physicians for Medicaid beneficiaries was highly correlated with the 
state Medicaid payment levels, so that "when competing payers pay higher fees, 
physicians are less likely to treat Medicaid patients." Schwartz et al., supra note 
39, a t  132. But see Olson, supra note 23, a t  478 (noting that a study of Medicaid 
recipients in Maine showed that a 60% increase in physician reimbursement rates 
increased physician services by only 10%). 
50. See, e-g., Douglas P. Shuit, Indigent Patients Face Uncertainty, Chaos, 
Risk, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1995, a t  B10 (discussing reduction of public primary care 
services in Los Angeles County); Barbara Walsh, Needy Will Feel Effects of HRS 
Cuts: Budget for Broward's Public Clinics Is Being Trimmed by 4,437,353, FT. 
LAUD. SUN-SENTINEL, July 6, 1995, a t  3B (reporting that the budget for public 
health clinics in Broward County, Florida, was reduced by 32%, which could mean 
that "thousands of uninsured people may not get prenatal care, immunizations or 
treatment for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseasesn). 
51. Kevin Sack, Public Hospitals Around the Country Cut Basic Service, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1995, $ 1, at 1. 
52. Regina Morris, chief operating officer of the NYCHHC, has estimated that 
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These barriers to primary care undermine the efficient 
delivery of care and may actually increase the overall cost of 
treating the uninsured. Illnesses and conditions afflicting unin- 
sured patients that could be treated early and inexpensively by 
primary care physicians frequently become serious and cost- 
ly.53 For example, a 1990 study of the uninsured population in 
the District of Columbia revealed that appropriate primary care 
could have prevented 23.5% of all hospital admissions of unin- 
sured patients." A more recent study of preventable hospital 
admissions in California's urban areas found an elevated rate 
of admission for patients living in communities with greater 
proportions of uninsured residents.55 In addition, those unin- 
sured patients who do manage to obtain primary care often 
receive it in extremely expensive settings. Thousands of un- 
insured patients visit hospital emergency rooms for routine 
treatment because they are unable to obtain outpatient care." 
Such treatment could be administered much less expensively in 
a primary care physician's office or a community clinic.57 In 
New York City public health facilities meet only 5% of the demand for outpatient 
services. Hearings on Health Care Service Delivery Infrastructure, supra note 24, at  
217. 
53. See Pete Stark, The MediPlan Health Care Act of 1991: H.R. 650, 3 STAN. 
L. & POLV REV. 33, 34 (1991) ("Research shows that uninsured persons are less 
likely to have children appropriately immunized, less likely to receive prenatal 
care, and less likely to see a physician if they have serious symptoms."). 
54. Billings & Teicholz, supra note 48, at  163 exhibit 4; see also Carol 
Goldberg, Health Care Reform: How Ready Is LI?, LI BUS. NEWS, July 25, 1994, a t  
21 (reporting that, in 1992, more than twenty-four thousand Long Island, New 
York, residents "were admitted to area hospitals for reasons that might have been 
prevented through primary care," resulting in $154.8 million in "avoidable costs"). 
55. Andrew B. Bindman et al., Preventable Hospitalizations and Access to 
Health Care, 274 JAMA 305, 308-09 (1995). The study also found that, for resi- 
dents of communities with the worst access to primary care, the preventable hospi- 
talization rate was roughly four times higher than for residents of communities 
with the greatest access. Id. at  308. 
56. See Olson, supra note 23, at  464. 
57. See id. at  483 (noting that a "community clinic can offer primary care 
less expensively than a hospital emergency room because it need not stand ready 
to deliver urgent care throughout the day"). Recall that EMTALA requires all hos- 
pitals with emergency care facilities to a t  least screen every patient applying for 
care. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, emergency 
rooms are often the only place the uninsured are assured of receiving immediate 
care. 
An additional-but non-financial-cost of administering primary care in emer- 
gency rooms is that it diverts staff and resources from true emergencies. This, in 
turn, may lead to additional inefficiencies, such as overstaffing. Olson, supra note 
23, a t  477. 
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short, lack of access to primary care results in inefficient treat- 
ment of the uninsured. 
Finally, encouraging more taxpayers to purchase health 
coverage reduces the number of individuals who spend down 
their assets into poverty. When an uninsured patient is strick- 
en with a catastrophic medical condition, she will first be 
forced to spend all her available cash to finance her care. After 
depleting this source, she will have to begin liquidating her 
assets. This process frequently pushes individuals or families 
into poverty. By inducing more taxpayers to obtain private 
coverage, the government reduces the incidence of so-called 
"spend down." This may not itself reduce health care expendi- 
tures, but it has beneficial secondary effects. For instance, it 
reduces the financial strain on government antipoverty pro- 
grams such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), state-administered general assistance, food stamps, 
and the earned income tax credit. 
In sum, the government has several salient reasons to 
encourage taxpayers to purchase private health coverage. As 
Senator John Rockefeller, chair of the U.S. Bipartisan Commis- 
sion on Comprehensive Health Care Reform (the Pepper Com- 
mission), recently wrote, "gaps in bealth] coverage are fueling 
health care inflation and costing billions of dollars-in emer- 
gency care that could have been prevented [and] in uncompen- 
sated care that gets shifted to the cash registers and pocket- 
books of employers and employees with health insu ran~e . "~~  
Excluding employer-sponsored health benefits from taxable 
income might therefore be a defensible means to induce more 
Americans to enroll in private health plans. 
B. Theoretical Rationales for Section 106 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  one  m i g h t  e x p l a i n  e x c l u d i n g  
employer-sponsored health insurance from taxation on more 
theoretical grounds. In his seminal article, Personal Deductions 
in an Ideal Income Tax, William Andrews articulated a theory 
for the "ideal" tax base for the personal income tax5' Andrews 
posited that "the ultimate purpose" of the income tax "is to 
apportion tax burdens in uniform, graduated relation to real 
58. John D. Rockefeller N, Health and the Underserved: Policy Decisions, 3 
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 27, 28 (1991). 
59. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972). 
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consumption and accum~lation."~~ While actual money expen- 
ditures are a sound starting point, Andrews argued that the 
allocation of resources for certain purposes is not personal 
consumption.61 Among such expenditures is the purchase of 
medical care.62 
Andrews closely examined the medical expense deduction, 
currently $ 213 of the code.63 He essentially contended that 
expenditures for medical care are not personal consumption 
because, rather than increasing a taxpayer's relative welfare, 
they merely return the taxpayer to a baseline state of good 
health.64 If the goal of the income tax is to allocate the burden 
according to "material well-being and taxable capacity," then 
medical expenses should be excluded because they do not re- 
flect a growth in the taxpayer's ability to pay." 6 Andrews 
explained, 
differences in health affect relative material well-being. It 
would be impractical to try to include robust good health 
directly as an element of personal consumption for those who 
have it, but the difference between good and poor health can 
be partially reflected--or the failure to include the difference 
directly can be partially offset--by also excluding or allowing 
a deduction for the medical services that those in poorer 
health will generally need more of.66 
The analogy between the exclusion of employee-sponsored 
health insurance and the medical expense deduction under 
$ 213 is imperfect, but much of the logic of Andrews's defense 
of 9 213 applies to the 5 106 exclusion as well. Like medical ex- 
penses, health insurance is "an intermediate good whose ulti- 
mate object is good health?? Resources dedicated to health 
coverage arguably do not reflect a taxpayer's well-being any 
more than do expenditures on medical care. Thus, one could 
say that 5 106 is justifiable on similar grounds: Resources de- 
60. Id. at 331. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. at 331-43. 
63. 6 U.S.C. 8 213 (1988). Section 213 permits taxpayers itemizing their de- 
ductions to deduct health care expenses that exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income. 
Id. When Andrews wrote his article, the floor was 3.0%, Andrews, supra note 59, 
at 332, but the difference (and the floor in general) is irrelevant to this discussion. 
64. Andrews, supra note 59, at 335-37. 
65. Id. at 335. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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voted to health insurance are not the "right basis for making 
interpersonal welfare comparisons on which to base the dis- 
tribution of tax burden~"~ because they do not augment an 
individual's relative welfare. 
111. DIFFICULTIES IN JUSTIFYING THE TAX TREATMENT OF 
HEALTH BENEFITS 
A. Problems with the Instrumental Justification 
While the government may have legitimate reasons for 
encouraging taxpayers to purchase private health coverage, its 
justifications cannot fully account for the current tax treatment 
of health benefits. First, although 8 106 may stimulate demand 
for private health insurance, the exclusion is available only to 
those taxpayers purchasing coverage through their employer. 
Not only is this restriction horizontally inequitable, it is also 
regre~sive.~' The exclusion is most valuable to taxpayers with 
the highest incomes, and it subsidizes the purchase of health 
benefits for those who are disproportionately well-off and who 
already have access to relatively high quality and inexpensive 
health in~urance.~' 
By excluding the cost of employer-sponsored health cover- 
age fkom taxation, Q 106 provides a subsidy for the purchasers 
of health insurance who least need it. Taxpayers unable to 
obtain employer-sponsored insurance must either acquire in- 
surance through another group or purchase individually under- 
written insurance. For several reasons--even ignoring tax ef- 
fects-employer-sponsored insurance is less expensive than 
that purchased by alternative means.71 The biggest reason for 
the discrepancy is that selling health insurance to an 
employment-related group minimizes the risk of "adverse selec- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  Adverse selection refers to the problem that those who 
68. Id. 
69. See Pauly et al., supra note 42, at 9. But see Thomas D. Griffith, Theo- 
ries of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 355-60 (1989) 
(contending that commentators have generally exaggerated the regressivity of the 
medical expense deduction). 
70. See Steven Findlay, Will Clinton End a Tax Exclusion on Benefits?, BUS. 
& HEALTH, Feb. 1993, at 51 (remarking that the 5 106 exclusion "benefits the 
well-off disproportionately" because, as a group, "they have better access to and can 
afford more health coverage"). 
71. Harold S. LuR & Robert H. Miller, Patient Selection in a Competitive 
Health Care System, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1988, at 97, 100. 
72. Greely, supra note 5, at 8-16. 
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choose to purchase health coverage generally represent a 
self-selecting, disproportionately unhealthy group. The problem 
arises because rational consumers will not purchase insurance 
until they believe that the cost of their claims will exceed the 
cost of their premiums.73 Selling insurance through employers 
minimizes the  r i sk  of adverse selection because 
employment-related groups constitute preexisting groups 
formed for a purpose other than to purchase health insurance. 
But when a consumer seeks to purchase health insurance indi- 
vidually, the risk of adverse selection is high. Consequently, 
insurers attempt to protect themselves by screening applicants 
for health problems (medical ~nderwriting),~~ limiting cover- 
age, and charging significantly higher premiums.75 
A second reason health benefits purchased through an 
employment-related group are less expensive than individual 
insurance is that offering coverage through an employer signif- 
icantly reduces administrative costs.76 In an employment set- 
ting, insurers need to interact only with group representatives 
(rather than each enrollee) for marketing and day-to-day ad- 
ministration. Also, because employment groups substantially 
mitigate the risk of adverse selection, insurers can avoid the 
administrative expenses involved in medical underwrit- 
ing-rigorously questioning, examining, or monitoring each 
73. As  a result, "from the perspective of the organization providing the health 
coverage, those who select the coverage will present 'adverse' claims experience; 
they will have higher costs than the general population's average." Greely, supra 
note 5, at  8-14. 
74. Id. at 8-17 ("Medical underwriting is widely used in selling individual 
health coverage, by both conventional insurers and HMOs."). 
75. Luft & Miller, supra note 71, at  102. Insurance companies are at a sub- 
stantial disadvantage because, as LuR and Miller explain, "the prospective enrollee 
is likely to know far more about his or her health than the insurer is. Therefore, 
carriers often restrict enrollment, require medical exams, or exclude coverage for 
preexisting conditions." Id. Adverse selection is an enormous obstacle in the market 
for individual health insurance because there is no constriction on who is eligible 
to purchase coverage-there is no preexisting group with a commonality other than 
the desire to purchase health coverage. Adverse selection is also a problem, albeit 
less of one, for insurers selling to groups unrelated to employment. Because mem- 
bership in these groups is often fairly costless, insurers fear that members have 
joined solely to gain access to health coverage. In contrast, there is almost no risk 
of adverse selection in employee groups because the availability of coverage gener- 
ally plays a smaller role in the individual's decision to join the group. Without 
reason to suspect that those purchasing employer-sponsored insurance will be un- 
usually unhealthy, insurers can still offer lower premiums and better coverage t o  
employment-related groups. 
76. Greely, supra note 5, at 8-16; Pauly et al., supra note 42, at 7. 
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benefi~iary?~ Thus, even assuming an inducement to purchase 
health insurance is appropriate, 5 106 tends to confer the bene- 
fi t  on those taxpayers for whom coverage is the least expensive: 
those with access to benefits through an employer. 
Section 106 is also regressive in at  least two other respects. 
First, as a group, those taxpayers able to obtain health cover- 
age through their employers are disproportionately well-off.?' 
In 1989, roughly 95% of all individuals with personal incomes 
over $30,000 had employer-sponsored health ins~rance.?~ By 
comparison, only 80% of those idividuals with incomes between 
$15,000 and $20,000, and 70% with incomes between $12,500 
and $15,000, had employer-provided  overage.^' Second, like 
any exclusion or deduction, 5 106 is most valuable to those 
taxpayers in the highest tax brackets? For example, the ex- 
clusion is worth $1,800 to a taxpayer in the 36% marginal tax 
bracket purchasing a $5,000 health insurance package; it is 
only worth $750 to a taxpayer in the 15% marginal tax bracket 
buying the same coverage. 
In addition to being regressive, the value of the 5 106 ex- 
clusion is overextensive: It subsidizes the purchase of health 
benefits beyond that necessary to accomplish the government's 
instrumental objectives. Health benefit packages come in sever- 
al varieties, and most large employers offer their employees a 
choice among plans.82 There are minimum, no-frills packages 
77. See Greely, supra note 5, at  8-16. The savings in administering a health 
plan through a large employer can be enormous. Roughly 5.5% of premium dollars 
go towards administrative costs in companies with 10,000 or more employees. Bry- 
an Dowd & Roger Feldman, Insurer Competition and Protection from Risk Redefini- 
tion in the Individual and Small Group Health Insurance Market, 29 INQUIRY 148, 
148 (1992). In contrast, the figure is close to 40% for individually underwritten 
policies. See John K. Inglehart, The American Health Care System: Private Insur- 
ance, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1715, 1719 (1992). 
78. See Richard Kronick, Health Insurance, 1979-1989: The Frayed Connection 
Between Employment and Insurance, 28 INQUIRY 318 (1991). 
79. Id. a t  322. 
80. Id. 
81. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 37 (1973) ("The translation and consequent restatement of a tax 
expenditure program in direct expenditure terms generally shows an upside-down 
result utterly at  variance with usual expenditure policies."). 
82. See generally Stanley B. Jones, Multiple Choice Health Insurance: The 
Lessons and Challenge to Private Insurers, 27 INQUIRY 161 (1990). One of the rea- 
sons employers offer a choice among plans is the HMO Act of 1973. Pub. L. No. 
93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (current version at  42 U.S.C. 300e (1988)). The HMO Act 
requires companies with 25 or more employees to offer an option between a t  least 
two health plans, one of which must be an HMO. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(a)(l) (1988). 
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as well as "premium" plans offering various additional benefits. 
For instance, a basic package may restrict the number of pro- 
viders which the beneficiary may see, require a higher deduct- 
ible, and exclude "luxury" items like orthodontics, cosmetic 
surgery, or experimental treatments. Premium packages, on 
the other hand, may cover these luxury items, permit beneficia- 
ries to see any physician, or reimburse beneficiaries for the 
extra costs of private hospital rooms. 
Health insurance packages also vary widely in the efficien- 
cy of their reimbursement schemes. More expensive health 
plans frequently reimburse hospitals and physicians on a 
fee-for-service basis, giving providers the financial incentive to 
prescribe excessive treatment.83 By contrast, less expensive 
plans often pay providers on a capitation basis-paying a flat 
sum per enrollee regardless of how much care is provided. 
Several studies have demonstrated that capitation payment 
schemes, most commonly used by health maintenance organiza- 
tions (HMOs), can significantly reduce costs while providing 
the same level of care.84 For instance, studies have reported 
that HMOs paying providers on a capitation basis reduce hospi- 
tal use by 10 to 40% as compared with fee-for-service reim- 
bursement me~hanisrns.~~ Of course, part of HMOs' ability to 
83. See Harold S. Luft, Translating the U.S. HMO Experience to Other Health 
Systems, HEALTH AW., Fall 1991, at  172, 175 (stating that, of the various health 
care reimbursement mechanisms, "fee-for-service payment gives physicians the 
strongest incentives to offer more services"); Janet L. Shikles & Lawrence H. 
Thompson, Strategies to Reduce Health Care Spending and Increase Coverage, 3 
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 104 (1991) ("[Ulnder a fee-for-service system, [physi- 
cians] have little incentive to control costs; reimbursement increases as more ser- 
vices are provided."). 
84. See Robert C. Bradbury et al., Comparing Hospital Length of Stay in 
Independent Practice Association HMOs and Traditional Insurance Programs, 28 
INQUIRY 87, 92 (1991) (finding that, "even after controlling for patient age, sex, 
case mix . . . severity of illness, and year of admission," membership in an HMO 
was "associated with shorter hospital stays"); Luft, supra note 83, at  185 ("There is 
substantial evidence that . . . [during the] 1980s, many HMOs were able to pro- 
vide care for their enrollees a t  substantially lower cost than fee-for-service care."). 
Some have argued, however, that capitation payment schemes--especially those 
in which doctors cannot spread their financial risk over many patients-create too 
strong of an incentive for physicians to skimp on care. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, 
Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743 (1987); Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incen- 
tives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health 
Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989). 
85. Ira Strumwasser et al., The Triple Option Choice: Self-selection Bias in 
Traditional Coverage, HMOs, and PPOs, 26 INQUIRY 432, 432 (1989); see also Jerry 
L. Malshaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming 
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reduce utilization and costs is attributable to their attraction of 
healthier enrollees and the participation of physicians with 
more parsimonious practice styles.86 Nonetheless, the Con- 
gressional Budget Office estimated in March 1994 that, con- 
trolling for the health status of enrollees, the most effective 
HMOs reduce the use of services by nine percent and decrease 
costs by four percent from traditional fee-for-service plans.87 
By permitting taxpayers to exclude the full cost of more expen- 
sive fee-for-service plans, the government may actually be sub- 
sidizing the inefficient provision of care." 
Justifying 5 106 on the ground that it encourages more 
taxpayers to purchase health coverage thus cannot account for 
extending the exclusion beyond the cost of a standard benefits 
package operated by an efficient insurer. The government 
would more effectively advance its objective of promoting the 
efficient delivery of care if it instead rewarded taxpayers for 
selecting basic plans that employ efficient reimbursement 
mechanisms. Consequently, if the objective of the exclusion is 
to reduce health care expenditures and promote the efficient 
delivery of care, 5 106 makes sense only to the extent that i t  
exempts no more than the average cost of an efficiently admin- 
istered basic benefit plan. 
B. Problems with the Theoretical Justification 
The theoretical justification for excluding health benefits 
from taxation-that health insurance does not augment a 
taxpayer's material well-being or taxability-suffers from infir- 
mities similar to those that undermine 5 106's instrumental 
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 457 
(1994) ("Studies suggest that, in some instances, HMOs may reduce hospital use by 
40% and total spending by 25%."). 
86. See John M. Eisenberg, Economics, 273 JAMA 1670, 1670 (1995). For in- 
stance, a General Accounting Office study found that 54% to 63% of HMOs accept- 
ing Medicare recipients enrolled Medicare beneficiaries who were healthier than 
average (favorable selection), and that the remaining HMOs enjoyed neutal selec- 
tion. Id. a t  1671 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGED HEALTH 
CARE: EFFECT ON EMPLOYERS' COSTS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE (1993)). HMOs en- 
rolled Medicare recipients who, on average, reported fewer disability days and 
lower hospital use prior to their enrollment than those recipients who remained in 
the fee-for-service plans. Id. 
87. Id. at  1671 (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF MANAGED 
CARE: AN UPDATE (1994)). 
88. See Main C. Enthoven, Good Cap, Bad Cap, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993, 
at  A15. 
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justifications. First, the theoretical justification fails to explain 
why  t h e  exclus ion  or  deduc t ion  i s  l i m i t e d  to  
employer-sponsored insurance. If the acquisition of 
employer-provided health coverage does not augment the mate- 
rial well-being of an individual, neither can health insurance 
obtained individually or through an alternative group. Whether 
the purchase of health insurance theoretically constitutes per- 
sonal consumption cannot depend on the means through which 
it is acquired. 
The ideal income tax base explanation is also flawed in a 
more fundamental respect. Namely, the purchase of health 
insurance, or at  least a portion of it, frequently does fall within 
Andrews' conception of personal consumption. Andrews con- 
tended that medical expenses are not personal consumption 
because they do no more than maintain a taxpayer's level of 
accumulation and taxabilit~.~' When a taxpayer purchases a 
health benefits package offering more than standard coverage, 
those dollars going toward the "premium" elements of the pack- 
age seem to f i t  Andrews's conception of personal consumption. 
That is, premium benefits do more than finance the taxpayer's 
maintenance of a baseline level of good health; they insure that 
the taxpayer will be especially healthy, or that, in the event of 
illness, she will be brought back to good health in a relatively 
luxurious fashion. 
Mark Kelman has criticized Andrews's defense of the 8 213 
medical expense deduction on similar  ground^.'^ Kelman 
rightfully noted that Andrews's argument rests in large part on 
the assumption that the amount an individual spends on 
health care is an accurate measure of the cost of maintaining 
the taxpayer's baseline state of good health. Indeed, the 
amount that taxpayers spend on health care reflects more than 
just the severity of their health  problem^.^' As Kelman point- 
ed out, personal health care expenses turn largely on the 
taxpayer's ability to pay.92 Health economists estimate that, 
89. Andrews, supra note 59, at 335-37. 
90. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in 
an Weal' Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 
STAN. L. REV. 831, 858-79 (1979). 
91. See Mark Kelman, Health Care Rights: Distinct Claims, Distinct Justifica- 
tions, 3 STAN. L. & POL? REV. 90, 96 (1991) (noting that "people don't simply 
demand some fured quantity of medical care whenever they feel a certain way, no 
more, no less"). 
92. FLTCHS, supra note 47, at 43 ("Health seems to be a normal good in the 
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while the quantity of health care demanded is less sensitive to 
income than the consumption of other goods, the income elas- 
ticity of demand for health care is very nearly one.93 In other 
words, a 10% rise in income on average leads to a 10% increase 
in the cost of health care consumed. Thus, wealthier taxpayers 
consume both more and more expensive care. These data con- 
firm that much of health care spending is actually discretion- 
ary consumption, meant to upgrade the quality of individuals' 
care rather than merely to pay the costs of returning them to 
good health. 
This analysis indicates that Q 106 permits taxpayers who 
purchase premium coverage to exclude income that reflects 
personal consumption. When taxpayers purchase health cover- 
age offering more than standard benefits, they are buying more 
than insurance against the costs of being returned to a baseline 
level of good health. The elements of coverage in excess of a 
standard benefits package, at  least in a sense, improve the 
quality of their coverage. Purchasing the premium elements of 
a health benefits package is a consumption decision that re- 
flects the taxability of the consumer. In Andrews' words, it 
reflects "choices among gratifications" rather than "differences 
in need."94 Thus, while the ideal income tax base theory may 
explain excluding the value of basic health coverage, it cannot 
justify extending the exclusion to the premium elements of a 
benefits package. 
As the discussion to this point indicates, the current tax 
treatment of health benefits is both underinclusive and 
overextensive as a matter of tax policy. It is underinclusive 
because it restricts those who may exclude or deduct the cost of 
health benefits to those taxpayers with access to 
employer-sponsored insurance. It is overextensive because it  
permits taxpayers to exclude more from taxation than can be 
justified by the government's objectives in maintaining the 
exclusion. The current form of Q 106 might still be warranted if 
sense that an increase in wealth leads to an increase in the demand for health."); 
Malshaw & Marmor, supra note 85, at 459 ("[Ultilization of [medical] service ap- 
pears more closely tied to economic status than to medical needs."). 
93. VICTOR R. NCHS & MARCIA J. KRAMER, DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDITURES 
FOR PIW!3ICIANS9 SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1948-1968, at 33 11.20 (1975). 
94. Andrews, supra note 59, at 336. 
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it furthered important health policy objectives. But, as the 
following discussion demonstrates, its impact on health policy 
has been decidedly detrimental. Indeed, 6 106 has substantially 
aggravated three significant problems in the health insurance 
market-job lock, cost-unconscious demand, and excessive de- 
mand. 
A. Job Lock 
Because of adverse selection, consumers must purchase 
health coverage through groups for the insurance market to 
operate at all effi~iently.~~ The group nexus need not be the 
beneficiaries3 employer; any sizable preexisting group may 
serve this fun~tion.'~ But because of the tax incentives, an 
overwhelming majority of Americans with private health cover- 
age obtain insurance through their employers. More than 85% 
of all Americans with private health insurance obtain that 
coverage through an empl~yer.~' Indeed, over 92% of all em- 
ployees of large and medium-sized firms-and 66% of all Amer- 
icans-procure health coverage though employment-related 
groups.98 
Making employers the dominant vehicle through which 
Americans purchase their health insurance has had some unde- 
sirable side effects." Foremost among them is the phenome- 
non of "job lock," the term describing the situation of an em- 
ployee who remains at her job solely to retain her health cover- 
age. Employers are not required to offer health benefits, and 
many American companies do not provide coverage due to its 
expense.loO Health insurance is particularly costly for small 
95. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
96. See Greely, supra note 5, a t  8-15 ("The group may be a group of employ- 
ees, a labor union, a church congregation, or a professional association, among 
others."). 
97. Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform 
Plan, HEALTH Am., Spring 1994, at  9, 17. 
98. Joel C. Cantor et al., Business LeadersJ Views on American Health Care, 
HEALTH Am., Spring 1991, at  98, 98. 
99. See FUCHS, supra note 47, a t  12 ("Sooner or later, the inequities and 
inefficiencies associated with employment-based health insurance will become so 
apparent as to dictate disengagement."); Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A 
Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a Sys- 
tem Designed to Promote Quality and Economy Part I.), 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
94, 94-95 (1989) ("If we were making a fresh start in health insurance, we would 
not recommend an  employment-based system, because of the many problems associ- 
ated with it."); Rockefeller, supra note 58, at  28 ("Losing one's job is bad enough, 
but unemployment in America almost always means being uninsured."). 
100. Wendy K. Mariner, Problems with Employer-Provided Health Insur- 
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busine~ses.'~' While 51% of all jobs in the American economy 
are with firms of one hundred or fewer employees, roughly 
one-third of these companies do not offer health benefits to 
their employees.102 In addition, 30% of the respondents to a 
recent survey of small businesses said that they likely will 
discontinue coverage in the foreseeable future. lo3 Changing 
jobs-particularly moving to a smaller company-may therefore 
mean the loss of health insurance. 
As noted earlier, individuals who want health coverage but 
who are unable to obtain employer-sponsored insurance are left 
with two choices: individually underwritten insurance or insur- 
ance administered through a group unrelated to employment. 
These types of insurance are extremely expensive by compari- 
sonlo4 and may offer much less comprehensive coverage than 
does employer-sponsored insurance. Insurers charge higher 
premiums and limit benefits for these types of coverage to 
protect against adverse sele~t ion, '~~ and consumers must pur- 
chase these policies with after-tax dollars. Perhaps most impor- 
tant, the majority of these types of insurance plans, particular- 
ly those offered to small groups or individuals, exclude coverage 
ance-The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Health Care Reform, 327 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682, 1682 (1992) (noting that, "[blecause of inflation in the 
cost of health benefits during the past decade, many employers, especially small 
companies without access to large-group insurance, find they cannot afford to fi- 
nance health care fully"). 
101. See Bryan Dowd & Roger Feldman, Insurer competition and Protection 
porn Risk Redefinition in the Individual and Small Group Health Insurance Mar- 
ket, 29 INQUIRY 148 (1992); Jennifer N .  Edwards et al., Small Businesses and the 
National Health Care Reform Debate, HEALTH Am., Spring 1992, 164; Alain C. 
Enthoven, Commentary: Measuring the Candidates on Health Care, 327 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 807 (1992); Stanley B. Jones, Employer-Based Private Health Insurance 
Needs Structural Reform, 29 INQUIRY 120 (1992); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Expanding 
Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Small Group Reform the Answer?, 29 IN- 
QUIRY 128 (1992); Wendy K. Zellers et al., Small-Business Health Insurance: Only 
the Healthy Need Apply, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1992, at  174. As Enthoven explains, 
groups of one hundred beneficiaries or fewer "are too small to spread risk, achieve 
economies of scale in administration, acquire and process the information needed to 
make good decisions, and participate in managed competition." Enthoven, supra, at  
807. Consequently, premiums for small businesses are much higher than those for 
large employers. 
102. Edwards et al., supra note 101, at  165. 
103. Id. at  167. 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77. 
105. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. The problem is most acute 
in the individual insurance market. Indeed, "most insurance companies have with- 
drawn from the market for individual unsponsored coverage," and "[wlhat remains 
is mostly poor coverage a t  high prices." Enthoven, supra note 34, a t  30. 
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of preexisting conditions-health problems contracted by the 
beneficiary prior to enrolling in the plan.lo6 Preexisting condi- 
tion exclusions mitigate the problem of adverse selection for 
insurers, but they can make it impractical for individuals to 
switch jobs.lo7 For instance, a woman who carries 
employer-provided insurance for herself and her diabetic hus- 
band may find it extremely difficult to change employment 
without having to pay for all the costs of her husband's condi- 
tion out of pocket for the first year at  her new job.lo8 If the 
insured's condition is more serious, he may be completely unin- 
surable once coverage is discontinued. Roughly eighty million 
Americans currently have medical problems that insurance 
companies might consider preexisting conditions, such as hy- 
pertension, diabetes, or asthma.log And, as of 1990, over 60% 
of all group health insurance plans contained preexisting condi- 
tion exc1usions.'" With the average American changing jobs 
106. Zellers et al., supra note 101, a t  175. 
107. See Eli Ginzberg, Health Care Reform-Where Are We and Where Should 
We Be Going?, 327 NEW ENG. J .  MED. 1310, 1310 (1992) (stating that "people with 
a history of serious medical problems often find that if they lose their coverage 
they are unable to replace it at  an affordable price"); Jeffrey R. Pettit, Help! We've 
Fallen and We Can't Get Up: The Problems Families Face Because of 
Employrnent-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L. REV. 779, 795 (1993) ("Employed 
workers may be forced to remain in their current jobs because they fear that a 
new employer will exclude as a preexisting condition an illness or disability which 
their health insurance currently covers."). 
108. Ginzburg, supra note 107, a t  1310. The average waiting period before an 
insurance policy will cover costs related to a preexisting condition is nine months, 
but may be as long as seven years. Id. 
109. Thomas Bodenheher, Underinsurance in America, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
274, 275 (1992). 
110. Id. In June 1995, President Clinton announced his proposal for federal 
regulation of the health insurance industry, which included provisions strictly cur- 
tailing insurers' ability to include preexisting condition exclusions in their policy 
contracts. Rich, supra note 13, a t  A21. Under the Administration's proposal, insur- 
ers would be permitted to exclude coverage for preexisting conditions for up to six 
months after an individual's first purchase of health insurance. Id. But when the 
individual changed employment and enrolled in a new plan, the new insurer would 
be prohibited f?om excluding coverage for any preexisting conditions. Id. 
On July 13, 1995, Senators Kassebaurn and Kennedy proposed their own 
"Health Insurance Reform Act of 1995." See Adam Clymer, 2 Senators Offer New 
Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1995, at  Al. Their bill would also restrict 
insurers' ability to exclude or limit coverage based on preexisting conditions. See S. 
1028, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. $5 101, 103 (1995). Insurers could limit or exclude 
coverage of preexisting conditions "only if- 
(1) the limitation or exclusion extends for a period of not more than 
12 months after the date of enrollment in the health plan; 
(2) the limitation or exclusion does not apply to an individual who, 
within 30 days of the date of birth, was covered under the plan; 
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every 4.2 years,'" barriers to adequate health coverage, such 
as the preexisting condition exclusion, may seriously impede 
efficient transitional movement throughout the w~rkforce."~ 
Indeed, in a 1993 CBS/New York Times poll, one in three 
Americans reported that someone in their household has re- 
mained at a particular job due to concern about losing their 
health benefits. '13 
Job lock would not exist if most Americans could obtain 
affordable health insurance through groups unrelated to their 
employment.'" For instance, if consumers purchased insur- 
ance through geographically-based groups, health benefits 
would be portable from one job to the next within the insured's 
region; there would be no risk of losing coverage solely due to 
changing employ~nent."~ Nevertheless, in the face of 5 106, 
purchasing through such groups would cost more than 
employer-sponsored insurance. Absent comprehensive reform 
that makes affordable coverage available to all Americans re- 
gardless of health status, job lock cannot be redressed without 
separating the purchase of health insurance from employ- 
ment-possible only by altering the tax treatment of health 
benefits. 
(3) the limitation does not apply to a pregnancy existing on the effec- 
tive date of coverage. 
Id. 103(a). 
111. Bodenheimer, supra note 109, a t  275. 
112. FuCHS, supra note 47, a t  12 ("Today workers' choices of job, decisions 
about job change, and timing of retirement are frequently influenced by health 
insurance considerations. As a result, labor market efficiency suffers."); Pettit, su- 
pra note 107, a t  795 (noting that job lock "stifles the potential of these [affected] 
workers and reduces American productivity"). 
113. Steven Pearlstein, A Hard Pill to Swallow: Health Care Reform May Be 
Bitter Economic Medicine, WASH. POST (weekly ed.), May 17-23 1993, a t  6, 7. 
114. Several reform proposals have emphasized the importance of separating 
the purchase of health insurance from the employment setting. See, e.g., THE HERI- 
TAGE FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (S. Butler & E. 
Haislmaier eds., 1989), (discussed in Pauley et al., supra note 42, at  23). 
115. Of course, establishing alternative group nexuses for health insur- 
ance-while solving the problem of job lock-may create new problems. For in- 
stance, if consumers were to purchase coverage through geographically-based 
groups, insurance companies might attempt to charge higher premiums and to offer 
limited coverage to beneficiaries living in low income communities because poorer 
patients are actuarially more expensive to insure. These problems, however, seem 
less complicated and easier to combat through government regulation. 
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B. Cost-unconscious Demand for Health Insurance 
With the proliferation of HMOs, preferred provider insur- 
ance, and various other financing mechanisms, the American 
health care system has moved increasingly toward a system. of 
competition in recent years.ll6 For any competitive market to 
function efficiently, consumer demand must be cost-conscious. 
That is, consumers must choose between competitive products 
or services based on their relative cost and quality. When de- 
mand is not cost-conscious, consumers are less sensitive to 
price in choosing among competing services, and efficient pro- 
viders are largely unable to take advantage of their 
cost-effectiveness. 
For several reasons, cost-unconsciousness predominates in 
the market for health insurance.l17 The single most signifi- 
cant factor is that over half of all employers offering health 
coverage pay the entire cost of their employees7 premium^."^ 
Because employers can deduct both wages and employee health 
benefits as business expenses under 5 162, they are generally 
indifferent as to how employees allocate their compensation 
between the two.11g But because of 5 106, employees receive 
116. Enthoven, supra note 34, at  26; Luft, supra note 83, a t  172 (noting the 
"increasingly competitive U.S. health care environmentn). See generally Kathleen 
Day, Hurnana Hunts Gold in Health Care Field: Controversial Firm Now Bids To 
Dominate the HMO Industry, WASH. POST., July 22, 1993, at  Al, A7. For evidence 
of the increasing proliferation of HMOs and PPOs, see Ginzberg, supra note 107, 
a t  1311 (stating that the number of enrollees in managed care programs, such as 
HMOs and PPOs, grew from roughly 10 million to 40 million during the 1980s); 
Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., Change and Growth in Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., 
Winter 1991, at  18; Cynthia B. Sullivan & Thomas Rice, The Health Insurance 
Picture in 1990, HEALTH AFT., Summer 1991, a t  104. 
117. See Pearlstein, supra note 113, at  6 (explaining that "Iolther consumer 
purchases, such as a car, involve some calculation of cost versus benefit," whereas 
"[mlost consumers make decisions about health care without regard to cost"); 
Shikles & Thompson, supra note 83, a t  104 ("Because patients are shielded from 
the direct costs of much of their care, any decisions they might make about types 
of care involve little regard for cost."). 
118. See Enthoven, supra note 34, a t  32; see also Enthoven & Kronick, supra 
note 35, at 29. Health care reform proposals aiming to infuse greater 
cost-consciousness into consumers' purchasing decisions have argued that employer 
contributions must be limited to a f ~ e d  amount. See id. at  33. 
119. Because employer-provided health benefits are exempt from the Federal 
Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) payroll t&, 26 U.S.C. 8 3121(a)(2)(A), (B) (1988), 
employers actually have a slight incentive to compensate employees in health bene- 
fits over wages. Congress could dramatically alter employers' incentives-and infuse 
cost-consciousness into the market for health insuranceby limiting the employer 
deduction to the regionally-adjusted average cost of a standard benefits package. 
Such a change would give employers a strong incentive to limit their contributions 
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more value in each dollar devoted to health benefits than to 
wages.l2' Thus, employees have a strong incentive to struc- 
ture their compensation packages so that employers pay the 
full cost of their health insurance. A 1986 study indicated that 
more than 54% of all employers-not just those offering health 
benefits-paid the entire cost of their employees' health insur- 
ance.121 Most large companies offer their employees a choice 
among plans, but where the employer covers the full cost re- 
gardless of which package the employees chose, employees have 
no incentive to discern between the plans based on cost or 
efficiency. 
Consider, for example, an employer offering two plans: an 
HMO plan with a standard benefits package, which costs the 
employer $150 per month per employee, and a premium, 
fee-for-service plan, which costs the employer $250 per month. 
Were the 5 106 exclusion limited to the average cost of a stan- 
dard benefits plan-here $150-an employee choosing the pre- 
mium package would have to include the $100 difference in her 
adjusted gross income. Granted, the employee would not bear 
the full cost of choosing the more expensive plan. The after-tax 
cost to the employee who selects the premium plan would only 
be the actual difference in cost multiplied by her marginal tax 
rate. Thus, a taxpayer in the 31% federal tax bracket and the 
five percent state tax bracket would have to pay an additional 
$36 per month in after-tax dollars to receive an additional $100 
worth of coverage. In contrast, under the current regime of 
5 106, the employee bears none of the additional cost in select- 
ing the more expensive plan. If her employer pays her entire 
premium, her choice between the two plans is completely 
cost-unconscious. 
Some large employers, such as Xerox,122 Stanford 
to employees' premiums, so that employees would have to pay the additional cost 
of luxury benefit packages with after-tax dollars. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
WORKING GROUP ON HEAI,TH CARE REFORM, CONTROLLING COSTS AND FINANCING 
HEALTH CARE REFORM THROUGH AN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED SYSTEM 15-17 (1993) 
[hereinafter ABA WORKING GROUP]; Findlay, supra note 70, a t  51. But see infia 
text accompanying notes 130-34 (discussing how employees could still pay their 
portion of health premiums with pretax dollars if their employer offers a "cafeteria 
plan" under 5 125). Former US. Representative Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) included 
such a provision in his proposed Managed Competition Act of 1992. H.R. 5936, 
102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992). 
120. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43. 
121. Enthoven, supm note 34, a t  32; see also Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 
35, a t  29. 
122. See Eric Faltermayer, Yes, the Market Can Curb Health Costs, FORTUNE, 
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Uni~ersi ty , '~~ the State of Minne~ota, '~~ and the State of 
Cal if~rnia , '~~ have attempted to infuse cost-consciousness into 
their employees' purchasing decisions by limiting their contri- 
butions to  health benefit packages. '26 For instance, the Cali- 
fornia Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), which 
purchased more than $1.3 billion in health insurance premiums 
for its employees in 1992, decided in 1990 to limit its monthly 
contribution to $410 per family.'27 CalPERS members, who 
constitute two thirds of all state and local government employ- 
ees in California, must cover any additional cost themselves 
with after-tax d01lars.l~~ In the first full year of the program, 
health plan rates for CalPERS increased by "only 6 percent, 
down from increases of 11 percent in 1990 and 17 percent in 
1989."129 
B u t  t h e s e  ef for t s  by employers  t o  promote  
cost-consciousness have been confounded by yet another provi- 
sion of the tax code. Employers large enough to run such min- 
iature "managed competition" programs also frequently offer 
their employees "cafeteria plans."'" These plans, authorized 
Dec. 28, 1993, at  84. 
123. See Liz Lempert, Health Plan Expenditures Rising, STANDARD m ,  Nov. 
10, 1989, a t  14. 
124. See Faltermayer, supra note 122, a t  84. 
125. Danielle Starkey, Controlling Costs and Improving Access--Solving the 
Health Care Dilemma, CAL. J . ,  Feb. 1993, at  7, 10. 
126. In 1996, for example, Stanford will offer its employees a choice of four 
different plans: 
Semi-Monthly Premium 
Plan Employee Only Employee and Family 
Kaiser $ 0.00 $33.00 
FHFVTakecare $11.00 $63.50 
Blue Shield Triple Option $17.50 $80.50 
Health Net $18.50 $83.00 
Janet Basu, Drop in Kaiser Rates Affects Cost of All Plans, STAN. REP., Oct. 25, 
1995, at  1, 3. Stanford limits its contributions to 94% of the lowest cost health 
plan for its full-time employees, and contributes an additional $4.00 per pay period 
(semi-monthly). Id. 
127. Starkey, supra note 125, a t  10. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at  10-11. CalPERS has subsequently required all of the HMOs with 
which it contracts to standardize their benefit packages, so that employees are 
better able to comparison shop based on price and quality and not on such criteria 
as level of copayments and the minutiae of which services are covered. See Henry 
T. Greely, Policy Issues in Health Alliances: Of Eficiency, Monopsony, and Equity, 
5 HEALTH MATRIX 37, 49 (1995). 
130. See Enthoven, supra note 88, a t  A15. 
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by 5 125 of the tax code, permit employees to set aside pretax 
dollars to purchase "qualified benefits."131 Health insurance is 
a "qualified benefit" for purposes of 5 125.'" Employees at  
firms offering cafeteria plans can therefore use those plans to 
pay for the portion of their premiums that exceeds the 
employer's contribution. Thus, even when an employer offering 
a cafeteria plan technically limits its contribution, employees 
can still pay for the cost of their health benefits entirely with 
pretax d01lars.l~~ "As a result, the employee's cost conscious- 
ness is attenuated, and the health plan has less need to cut its 
price to attract subs~ribers."'~~ 
For the health insurance market to operate efficiently, as 
health economist Alain Enthoven has explained, consumers 
"who choose one health plan that costs more than another 
(adjusted for health risks of the covered groups) must pay the 
extra cost with their own net after-tax dollars."135 Limiting 
the 5 106 exclusion to the average cost of a standard benefits 
package and prohibiting the use of cafeteria plans to pay 
health insurance premiums could go far in making consumers' 
purchasing decisions cost-conscious, and thereby alleviate effi- 
ciency-impeding, inflationary pressures on health care spend- 
ing. 
131. 26 U.S.C. 5 125 (1988); see generally Daniel C. Schaffer & Daniel M. Fox, 
Tax Law as Health Policy: A History of Cafeteria Plans 1978-1985, 8 AM. J. TAX 
POL'Y 1 (1989). 
132. 26 U.S.C. 5 125 (1988). 
133. See ABA WORKING ROUP, supra note 119, a t  13-14 (stating that "many 
believe that cafeteria arrangements seriously undermine health cost containment 
and substantially increase tax expenditures"); Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 35, 
a t  30 (noting that when "an employee chooses a health plan that is more rather 
than less costly, the government is likely to be paying about one-third of the dif- 
ference in cost in the form of tax relief"). 
134. Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 35, a t  30. 
135. Enthoven, supra note 34, a t  26. Enthoven calls cost-conscious demand 
essential "[flor a market system in health care financing and delivery to produce a 
reasonable approximation to efficiency and equity." Id.; see also Hilary Stout, 
Benefits-Taxation Idea Returns to White House Under Clinton after Failing as a 
Bush Proposal, WALL ST. J. ,  Dec. 30, 1992, at  A10 (reporting that advocates of 
greater cost-consciousness in the health insurance market "say the heightened con- 
sumer discernment would . . . lead the health industry-everyone from doctors and 
hospitals to health maintenance organizations and insurance companies-to compete 
for business on price, quality and efficiency"). 
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C. Excessive Demand for Health Insurance 
In addition to creating job lock and promoting 
cost-unconscious demand, 5 106 distorts the market for health 
insurance by creating excessive demand for health benefits.136 
Health insurance, like other employer-provided benefits, is part 
of the overall compensation package offered by  employer^.'^' 
Financial incentives created by the tax code, and particularly 
5 106, distort the cost of health benefits relative to cash wages. 
As a result, employees allocate too large a portion of their total 
compensation to health insu ran~e . '~~  
Consider a taxpayer in the 31% federal income tax and six 
percent state income tax brackets whose employer pays the 
entire cost of her health insurance. If her employer devotes an 
additional $1,000 to wages, the employee nets $514 in dispos- 
able income after income and payroll taxes.13' In contrast, 
employer-sponsored health insurance is exempt not only from 
the employee's and the employer's income taxes but also from 
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) payroll tax.140 
Thus, if the employee elects instead to receive the $1,000 in 
health benefits, she captures the full value of the increased 
compensation. For $514 in foregone cash wages, the employee 
receives $1,000 worth of health coverage.l4' In negotiating 
compensation packages with their employers, employees, there- 
fore, will prefer health benefits over wages until the marginal 
136. Although this seems to contradict the suggestion made earlier that con- 
sumers might underpurchase health insurance, see supra note 12, the two issues 
are conceptually distinct. While arguably too few consumers purchase private 
health coverage, this article contends that those who do purchase coverage buy too 
much. 
137. See Fuchs, supra note 31, a t  9 (noting that "[elmployers do not bear the 
cost of health insurance; workers do, in the form of lower wages or foregone 
nonhealth benefitsn). 
138. See Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J .  POL. 
ECON. 251 (1973). A recent historical study found that as early as 1978, "most 
economists agreed that health insurance contributed to the rising costs of health 
servicesn and that "tax law helped to inflate costs. Because employer-provided 
health insurance was tax free, workers had reason to prefer health insurance to 
other goods and services that they could purchase only out of after-tax income." 
Schaffer & Fox, supra note 131, at  7. 
139. The $1,000 represents $929 in strict wage increase and $71 in the 
employer's attendant FICA payroll tax liability ($929 x 7.65%). Subtracting the 
employee's share of the FICA payroll tax ($71), her federal income tax liability 
($929 x 31%, or $288), and her state income tax liability ($929 x 6%, or $56), the 
employee is left with $514 in disposable income from the raise. 
140. 26 U.S.C. 8 3121(a)(Z)(A), (B) (1988). 
141. For a similar example, see Greely, supra note 5, a t  8-21 to 8-22. 
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dollar devoted to health coverage is worth fifty-one cents to the 
emp10yee.l~~ For taxpayers in similar tax brackets, the tax 
code, likewise, essentially halves the cost of health insurance. 
Health policy experts widely acknowledge that the current 
tax treatment of health benefits promotes excessive demand for 
health insurance.143 As a group of health economists recently 
wrote, "by permitting the purchase of health insurance with 
pretax dollars, [the tax code] encourages people to buy more in- 
surance than they need, thus fueling health care inflation."lM 
And although the rate of growth of health care expenditures 
has tapered off slightly in the last two years,145 health care 
costs continue to consume an inordinate portion of the nation's 
resources. The United States devotes a greater percentage of 
its gross domestic product (GDP) to health care than any other 
OECD country,'" exceeding by one-third the amount spent 
142. Cf: ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, a t  10 (explaining that "most 
workers prefer to get a compensation package comprised in part of nontaxable 
benefits because those nontaxable benefits are more valuable than comparable 
benefits purchased with after-tax dollars"). 
143. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, a t  10 (noting that "economists are 
concerned that the unlimited exclusion encourages the purchase of health insurance 
that is not worth its full cost, i.e., that tax subsidies encourage employees to buy 
more generous health plans than workers would purchase themselves with after-tax 
dollars"); Findlay, supra note 70, at  51 (reporting that President Clinton and other 
Democrats acknowledge that the 8 106 exclusion "gives the majority of Americans 
an incentive to purchase excess health insurance"). But see Uwe E. Reinhardt, The 
Clinton Plan: A Salute to American Pluralism, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, a t  161, 
171 (suggesting that analysts have overstated the effects of 0 106 in artificially 
stimulating demand for health insurance). 
144. Pauly et al., supra note 42, at  9. 
145. In 1993, national health care expenditures grew by 7.8%, down from 
10.7% in 1990. Rich, supra note 13, a t  A21. The most recent estimate for 1994 is 
6.1%. Id. From 1983 to 1993, health care expenditures grew a t  a rate roughly 
double that of inflation. Pearlstein, supra note 113, a t  7. Between 1970 and 1989, 
per capita health care expenditures rose from $1,026 to $1,554 in constant dollars. 
Eli Ginzberg, Health Care Reform-Why So Slow?, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1464, 
1464 (1990). 
146. John K. Inglehart, Health Policy Report.. Canada's Health Care System, 
315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 202, 205 table 1 (1986). (The OECD is the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development.) In 1983, the U.S. total expenditure on 
health care was 10.8% of GDP as compared to the OECD average of 7.6%. Id.; see 
also Aki Yoshikawa et al., How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals in a 
Universal Health Care System, 3 STAN. L. & POL% REV. 111, 115 figure 4 (1991). 
American corporations have grown increasingly concerned that the costs of 
health care are hindering their international competitiveness. The director of feder- 
al relations for the Chrysler Corporation recently wrote that in 1988, "foreign 
automakers [had] a $300 to $500 per car advantage over us due to health costs 
alone." Walter B. Raher, Health Care in America: Implications for Business and the 
Economy, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 55, 56 (1991). Raher further stated that "were 
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by any other major industrialized nation.14? The Health Care 
Financing Administration has projected that by the year 2000, 
national health care expenditures will reach $1.7 trillion, 18.1% 
of the GDP.148 AS the coordinator of the Clinton 
Administration's ill-fated health care reform task force, Ira 
Magaziner, recently wrote, "the current upward trajectory for 
health care costs suggests that actions must be taken more 
quickly to control costs in order not to imperil economic prog- 
r e ~ s . " ' ~ ~  Against this backdrop, a tax provision that stimu- 
lates excessive demand for health benefits makes little sense. 
The current tax treatment of employer-provided health 
insurance is unsound both as tax policy and as health policy. 
Section 106 inequitably benefits only those able to obtain 
health insurance through their employers, taxpayers who gen- 
erally are least in need of financial assistance in purchasing 
health benefits. In addition, § 106 subsidizes the purchase of 
premium benefit packages and relatively inefficient 
fee-for-service insurance plans, both of which contribute to 
health care inflation. At the same time, 5 106 ties the purchase 
of insurance to the employment setting-creating the problem 
of job lock-and contributes significantly to the problems of 
cost-unconsciousness and excessive demand in the health insur- 
ance market. 
To address these problems, Congress should implement 
three basic alterations to the tax code's current treatment of 
health benefits. First, Congress should extend § 106's exclusion 
to all taxpayers, regardless of the source through which they 
obtain coverage.150 This would end the horizontal inequity be- 
tween taxpayers who purchase through employers and those 
we to consume health services in America a t  the same rate as that of West Ger- 
many and Japan, we would have an extra $300 billion per year available to rein- 
vest in our economy." Id. at  55. 
147. Shikles & Thompson, supra note 83, at  103. 
148. Id. The Congressional Budget Office reached the same conclusion. See 
Priest, supra note 47, a t  A17. To put this projection in perspective, consider that 
health care spending amounted to only 6% of U.S. GDP in 1965. Id. 
149. Dana Priest, Stunting the Growth of Medical Costs: Clinton's Advisers 
Draft Short-Term Options That Include Price Controls, WASH. POST (weekly ed.), 
Feb. 22-28, 1993, a t  32. 
150. Thus, the deduction should be available to all taxpayers, not just those 
who itemize their deductions and who obtain insurance through their employers. 
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who obtain coverage by other means. It would also diminish 
the incentive to purchase employer-sponsored insurance, mak- 
ing it possible to separate the purchase of health insurance 
from the employment setting. Second, Congress should limit 
the value of the individual exclusion or deduction-as well as 
the employer deduction-to the regionally-adjusted cost of an 
efficiently administered standard benefits package. Under such 
a restriction, employers would have a strong incentive to limit 
their contributions to the cost of a standard benefits plan, and 
taxpayers wishing to purchase premium packages or plans 
employing less efficient reimbursement mechanisms would 
have to pay the extra cost with after-tax d01lars.l~~ Consumer 
decisions would therefore be more cost-conscious, dampening 
the incentive for taxpayers to overpurchase health coverage 
and eliminating the government subsidy of the premium ele- 
ments of health care packages. Finally, to preserve the 
cost-consciousness created by limiting the exclusion, Congress 
should alter 5 125 to prevent employees from using cafeteria 
plans to pay their portions of their insurance premiums with 
pretax dollars. 
These reforms make particular sense in light of the current 
political mood favoring incremental, market-driven reforms to 
health care financing. The demise of the Clinton health plan is 
largely attributable to its comprehensiveness and its preference 
for command-and-control regulatory solutions. ls2 Americans 
resisted any drastic change-particularly through direct gov- 
151. If the 0 106 exclusion is capped, it is crucial that the limit be 
dollar-denominated. In other words, while the limit should be based on the 
regionally-adjusted cost of a standard benefits package, it must be a uniform flat 
dollar cap. See Enthoven, supra note 88, a t  A15. Some proposals have suggested 
that the limit be benefitdenominated, permitting a full exclusion or deduction for 
coverage offering no more than standard benefits regardless of price. See ABA 
WORKING GROUP, supra note 119, at  5-6. But this would fall short of infusing true 
cost-consciousness into the market. Taxpayers purchasing standard benefits packag- 
es would remain less sensitive to price, and insurers' incentive to improve efficien- 
cy would remain dampened. Enthoven, supra note 88, a t  A15. As Enthoven recent- 
ly wrote, a benefitsdenominated cap "simply does not address the incentives prob- 
lem." Id. Rather, a benefitsdenominated cap would mean that the "federal govern- 
ment would continue to be in the way, taxing efficient choices, subsidizing wasteful 
choices." Id. 
152. See generally Robert J .  Blendon et al., What Happened to Americans' Sup- 
port for the Clinton Health Plan?, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, a t  7. In discussing 
the Administration's effort at health care reform in his January 1995 State of the 
Union Message, President Clinton conceded, "We bit off more than we could chew." 
Spencer Rich, Clinton Offers a Limited Version of Health Reform, WASH. POST, Jan. 
26, 1995, a t  All. 
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ernmental involvement-to the delivery or financing of some- 
thing so personally important. At the same time, the Adminis- 
tration underestimated the political difficulties in comprehen- 
sively reforming an industry comprising one-sixth of the U.S. 
economy and affecting the operation of every American busi- 
ness. The reforms suggested here are modest by comparison, 
and they are consistent with current political preferences for 
market-based regulatory measures.'" Instilling greater 
cost-consciousness in consumers' health insurance purchasing 
decisions would promote important public policy objectives 
through purely voluntary consumer choices. 
Nonetheless, these reforms still face stiff opp~sition.'~~ 
Several potent political forces, most notably organized labor, 
have vehemently opposed any change in the tax law's treat- 
ment of employer-sponsored health insu ran~e . '~~  Many tax- 
payers who benefit from the exclusion are also likely to raise 
fierce res is tan~e . '~~ Like the home mortgage interest deduc- 
153. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulato- 
ry State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) ("The government should shift from 
command-and-control regulation to more experimentation with . . . economic incen- 
tives."). 
154. Most recently, in March 1994, the House Ways and Means Subcommitte 
on Health rejected the inclusion of a limit on the health benefits exclu- 
sion/deduction in the Clinton Administration's health care reform package. Robert 
Pear, Employer-Paid Health Care Backed by House Panel, 6-5, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 1994, at A16. The only serious attempt to alter the tax treatment of 
employer-provided health insurance thus far during the 104th Congress was recent- 
ly proposed by House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt. Clay Chandler, Gephardt 
Offers Proposal to Cut Income Tax Rate: Democrat Says Plan Helps Working and 
Middle Class, WASH. POST, July 7, 1995, a t  C1. Gephardt's plan would reduce the 
basic marginal rate for three-fourths of American taxpayers to lo%, and it  would 
eliminate most deductions and exclusions, including that for employer-provided tax 
insurance. Id. 
155. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: 
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tion, the exemption of employer-sponsored benefits has become 
an entrenched part of the American political landscape. As 
such, most taxpayers will perceive any limit on the exclusion as 
a new tax on health coverage.'" Thus, although Clinton Ad- 
ministration officials spoke seriously of limiting the exclusion 
during and immediately following the 1992 presidential cam- 
~ a i g n , ' ~ ~  the task force on health care reform officially with- 
drew the idea from consideration only one month after 
~0nvening. l~~ Persevering in the face of political pressure, 
however, could reap sizable long-term benefits. Reforming the 
tax treatment of employer-sponsored health coverage is vital to 
containing the growth of health care expenditures and to treat- 
ing taxpayers more equitably. 
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